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The belief bias effect in reasoning (Evans
et al., 1983) is the tendency for logical
problems with believable conclusions (e.g.,
some addictive things are not cigarettes) to
elicit more positive responses than those
with unbelievable conclusions (some ciga-
rettes are not addictive things). The effect
of believability interacts with conclusion
validity (see the lower rows of Table 1 for
example data), leading many researchers
to conclude that reasoning accuracy is
greater for problems with unbelievable
conclusions (e.g., Oakhill and Johnson-
Laird, 1985; Newstead et al., 1992; Quayle
and Ball, 2000). Dube et al. (2010, 2011)
[see also Heit and Rotello (2014)] demon-
strated that the typical ANOVA analysis of
these behavioral data was inappropriate,
and showed that a signal detection based
interpretation of the data reached a differ-
ent conclusion, namely that the effect of
conclusion believability was to shift sub-
jects’ response bias to be more liberal. Trip-
pas et al. (2013) also concluded that con-
clusion believability consistently affected
response bias, but that reasoning accuracy
was additionally affected by believability
under certain conditions (i.e., higher cog-
nitive ability, complex syllogisms, unlim-
ited decision time).
The belief bias effect has also been
studied in the neuroscience literature,
although the focus has been slightly dif-
ferent. Whereas in the behavioral litera-
ture, researchers have focused on the accu-
racy with which subjects can discriminate
valid from invalid conclusions, in the neu-
roscience literature, questions have cen-
tered on the brain regions responsible for
resolving the conflict between the logically
correct response to a problem and the
believability of its conclusion. That is, neu-
roscience analyses have divided test trials
into those for which validity and believabil-
ity lead to the same conclusion (congruent
trials) and those for which they lead to dif-
ferent conclusions (incongruent trials). A
consistent finding is that the percentage of
correct responses is higher for congruent
than incongruent trials, an effect attrib-
uted to the competition between System
1, which drives belief-based responding,
and System 2, which drives logic-based
decisions (e.g., Goel et al., 2000; Tsujii
and Watanabe, 2010; cf. Evans and Curtis-
Holmes, 2005). A similarly consistent find-
ing is the selective activation of right pre-
frontal cortex (rPFC) for incongruent, and
not congruent, test trials, suggesting a role
for rPFC in conflict detection and/or res-
olution (fMRI: Goel et al., 2000; Goel and
Dolan, 2003; Stollstorff et al., 2012; fNIRS:
Tsujii and Watanabe, 2009, 2010; Tsujii
et al., 2010b; TMS: Tsujii et al., 2010a). For
example, Stollstorff et al. (2012) noted that
right lateral PFC“is consistently engaged to
resolve conflict in deductive reasoning” (p.
28). In ERP,a late positivity for incongruent
trials has been interpreted similarly (Luo
et al., 2008, 2013). These data suggest that
rPFC activation inhibits System 1 respond-
ing, a conclusion that is broadly consistent
with the assumed inhibitory function of
right inferior frontal cortex (Aron et al.,
2014).
We will begin by showing that the par-
titioning of trials and subsequent analysis
are based on faulty logic, such that the
intended comparison of accuracy for con-
gruent versus incongruent trials actually
reflects differences in the “valid” response
rates to believable and unbelievable prob-
lems. Using simple algebra, we show that
accuracy for congruent and incongruent
trials can only be equal when the ‘valid’
response rate does not vary with believ-
ability. Second, we will turn to the inter-
pretation of the corresponding brain data,
arguing that it is also flawed because of its
dependence on those very same accuracy
differences. Finally, we will suggest an alter-
native interpretation of rPFC activation in
the belief bias task.
In belief bias studies, accuracy for the
congruent trials, Ac, is measured using per-
cent correct. It is simply the average of the
“valid” (hit) response rate in the believable
condition (H B) and the “invalid” (correct
rejection) response rate in the unbelievable
condition (CRU):
AC = 1
2
(HB + CRU) (1)
Likewise, accuracy for the incongru-
ent trials, AI, is simply the average of the
hit rate in the unbelievable condition and
the correct rejection rate in the believable
condition:
AI = 1
2
(HU + CRB) (2)
For example, for the representative
data in the lower rows of Table 1,
AC= 0.5(0.86+ 0.68)= 0.77, and AI= 0.5
(0.68+ 0.39)= 0.54, implying that accu-
racy is higher for the congruent than the
incongruent trials. Interestingly, the accu-
racy advantage seen for congruent trials
is observed even though believability did
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Table 1 | Data from Dube et al. (2010).
Experiment Condition Response rates
H =P (“valid”| Miss=P (“invalid”| F =P (“valid”| CR=P (“invalid”| Overall “valid”
Valid) Valid) invalid) invalid) response rate
1 Liberal 0.79 0.21 0.67 0.33 0.730
Conservative 0.55 0.45 0.31 0.69 0.430
2 Believable 0.86 0.14 0.61 0.39 0.735
Unbelievable 0.68 0.32 0.32 0.68 0.500
not affect validity discrimination in this
experiment (Dube et al., 2010, Exp. 2).
The interpretation of the neuroscience
data on belief bias depends crucially on the
difference in accuracy for congruent and
incongruent trials. To understand these
data, we first show that interpretation of
the percent correct accuracy measure actu-
ally depends on response rate differences.
Let us spend a moment examining how the
accuracy difference could come about, by
starting with the question of when accu-
racy for the two trial types would be equal.
In other words, under what conditions does
AC=AI, or, equivalently, when is Eq. 3
true?
1
2
(HB + CRU) = 1
2
(HU + CRB) (3)
Because the correct rejection rate, CR,
equals 1 minus the false alarm rate, F, we
can rewrite Eq. 3:
1
2
(HB + 1− FU) = 1
2
(HU + 1− FB) (4)
Some reorganization and simplification
yields
1
2
(HB + FB) = 1
2
(HU + FU) (5)
Equation 5 is revealing, because the
average of the hit and false alarm rates
equals the “yes” rate (assuming equal num-
ber of target and lure trials). As Macmillan
and Creelman (2005) showed, the yes rate
is a measure of response bias, not accu-
racy. Thus, Eq. 5 shows that the congru-
ent and incongruent trials can only yield
equal accuracy (measured with percent
correct; a related argument applies to d ′) if
the response rates to believable and unbe-
lievable problems are the same. This bias
restriction is unlikely to be met, because the
belief bias effect itself is a difference in pos-
itive response rates with conclusion believ-
ability (e.g., Evans et al., 1983; Dube et al.,
2010, 2011; Trippas et al., 2013). Believ-
able problems tend to elicit more positive
responses both for valid and invalid con-
clusions; thus, it is easy to see that the
congruency analysis will produce AC >AI.
Starting with a version of Eq. 4 that assumes
AC >AI
1
2
(HB + 1− FU) > 1
2
(HU + 1− FB) (6)
we can simplify and reorganize to see that
AC >AI whenever
HB −HU > FU − FB (7)
Because both the hit and false alarm rate
are higher to problems with believable con-
clusions, the left side of the inequality in
Eq. 7 will be positive, and the right side
will be negative: AC will always be greater
than AI if believable conclusions elicit more
positive responses than unbelievable con-
clusions. This observation generalizes to
any empirical manipulation that elicits a
response rate difference, as long as the more
liberal condition is treated as analogous to
the believable problems. For example, the
upper rows of Table 1 show data from Dube
et al. (2010) (Exp. 1), which was a syllogis-
tic reasoning task on abstract problems that
were structurally identical to those in their
belief bias experiments. One group of sub-
jects was told that 85% of the problems had
a valid conclusion, and another group was
told that 15% of the conclusions were valid,
though in fact both groups were given iden-
tical problem sets in which 50% of con-
clusions were logically valid. Treating the
liberal condition as analogous to the believ-
able problems, and letting the conservative
condition play the role of the unbelievable
problems, we can compute AC= 0.74 and
AI= 0.44, implying that accuracy is higher
for the congruent than the incongruent tri-
als despite the absence of any believable (or
unbelievable) content.
We turn now to the neuroscience liter-
ature, for which we argue that differences
in response rates have been misinterpreted
as accuracy differences. Neuroscience stud-
ies of belief bias have consistently found
selective activation of rPFC to incongruent
trials (Goel et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan,
2003; Tsujii and Watanabe, 2009, 2010; Tsu-
jii et al., 2010a,b; Stollstorff et al., 2012).
Indeed, Tsujii and Watanabe (2009, 2010)
and Tsujii et al. (2010b) took this general
finding a step further. In each of these three
studies, they reported a positive correla-
tion between the magnitude of activation
in rIFC and the difference in accuracy lev-
els for incongruent and congruent trials.
Tsujii and Watanabe (2009) wrote “sub-
jects with enhanced activation in the right
IFC could also perform better in conflicting
[incongruent] reasoning trials” (p. 121).
As we have seen, however, accuracy differ-
ences as a function of congruency simply
reflect a different “valid” response rate to
problems with believable and unbelievable
conclusions. So, a better interpretation of
these data is that right IFC activation cor-
relates with the magnitude of that response
rate difference. The scatter plots in each of
these studies show that the highest degree
of selective activation (largest difference
for incongruent compared to congruent
trials) corresponds to accuracy differences
(incongruent minus congruent) that are
zero or positive, meaning that those sub-
jects showed an atypical response to the
belief bias task: either they showed no
response rate difference with believabil-
ity (and thus had no accuracy difference,
see Eq. 5) or they made more positive
responses to unbelievable than believable
conclusions (and thus had higher accuracy
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for incongruent trials than congruent, see
Eq. 7).
Tsujii et al. (2010a) used TMS to show
that disruption to right IFC increased the
magnitude of the accuracy difference with
congruency: subjects showed large accu-
racy advantages for congruent trials, which
can only occur because of large response
rate effects of believability (Eq. 7). Inter-
estingly, disruption to left IFC eliminated
the accuracy advantage for congruent tri-
als, meaning that the “valid” response rate
to believable and unbelievable conclusions
was at least roughly equated (Eq. 5).
Our analysis of the accuracy effect of
congruency shows that the analyses in the
neuroscience literature on belief bias have
not directly addressed why congruency dif-
ferences occur, the brain regions respon-
sible for conflict detection/resolution, or
the relative involvement of reasoning Sys-
tems 1 (belief) and 2 (logic). None of those
processes have been shown to be involved
in the appearance of an accuracy difference
with congruency (see Eqs 5 and 7). Instead,
the selective activation of prefrontal cor-
tex in response to incongruent problems
must be a consequence of the response rate
difference for believable and unbelievable
problems.
The failure to consider response rate dif-
ferences across conditions has also lead to
the misinterpretation of behavioral data
in a variety of domains (e.g., Verde and
Rotello, 2003; Rotello et al., 2005; Dou-
gal and Rotello, 2007; Evans et al., 2009;
Mickes et al., 2012) and of other neuro-
science data. For example, fMRI evidence
from perceptual categorization and recog-
nition tasks had been interpreted as show-
ing distinct cortical systems for these tasks
(e.g., Reber et al., 1998). However, Nosofsky
et al. (2012) noted that the “yes” response
rate also differs by task: categorization nat-
urally suggests a more liberal response cri-
terion than recognition. When activation
patterns were compared for categorization
tasks and a recognition task in which sub-
jects were instructed to use a liberal recog-
nition criterion, no differences in brain
activation were found; the distinct pat-
terns were attributable to the response bias
difference.
Some recent neuroscience studies have
explicitly manipulated the decision crite-
rion across trials. In simple perceptual tasks
such as line length discrimination, this can
be accomplished by showing participants
the length of the line to use as the bound-
ary between “short” and “long” responses.
Using this strategy, White et al. (2012)
found left inferior temporal cortex, which
is responsible for representing objects, was
activated in response to the decision cri-
terion itself. They suggested that the cri-
terion value (here, an explicitly provided
line length) was stored much like any other
stimulus, and so its particular brain loca-
tion would vary with the task. In the case
of syllogistic reasoning, the decision cri-
terion represents a level of evidence for
the validity of the conclusion. Where this
information would be stored is an inter-
esting question to consider, but it seems
that one possible place to starting looking
would be in the right inferior frontal cor-
tex. More generally, we see much promise
in future neuroscience studies of belief bias
that take account of what can be inferred
from analysis of behavioral measures.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Caren M. Rotello identified the problem
and wrote the first draft. Evan Heit pro-
vided critical revisions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study is based upon work while
Evan Heit was serving at the National
Science Foundation. Any opinion, find-
ings, and conclusions or recommendations
expressed in this material are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Science Foundation.
REFERENCES
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., and Poldrack, R. A.
(2014). Inhibition and the right inferior frontal cor-
tex: one decade on. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 177–185.
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.003
Dougal, S., and Rotello, C. M. (2007). “Remember-
ing” emotional words is based on response bias,
not recollection. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 14, 423–429.
doi:10.3758/BF03194083
Dube, C., Rotello, C. M., and Heit, E. (2010). Assess-
ing the belief bias effect with ROCs: it’s a response
bias effect. Psychol. Rev. 117, 831–863. doi:10.1037/
a0019634
Dube, C., Rotello, C. M., and Heit, E. (2011). The
belief bias effect is aptly named: a reply to Klauer
and Kellen (2011). Psychol. Rev. 118, 155–163.
doi:10.1037/a0021774
Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L., and Pollard, P. (1983).
On the conflict between logic and belief in syllo-
gistic reasoning. Mem. Cognit. 11, 295–306. doi:10.
3758/BF03196976
Evans, J. S. B. T., and Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005). Rapid
responding increases belief bias: evidence for the
dual-process theory of reasoning. Think. Reason.
11, 382–389. doi:10.1080/13546780542000005
Evans, K., Rotello, C. M., Li, X., and Rayner, K. (2009).
Scene perception and memory revealed by eye
movements and ROC analyses: does a cultural dif-
ference truly exist? Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 62, 276–285.
doi:10.1080/17470210802373720
Goel, V., Buchel, C., Frith, C., and Dolan, R. (2000).
Dissociation of mechanisms underlying syllogistic
reasoning. Neuroimage 12, 504–514. doi:10.1006/
nimg.2000.0636
Goel, V., and Dolan, R. (2003). Explaining modula-
tion of reasoning by belief. Cognition 87, 11–22.
doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(02)00185-3
Heit, E., and Rotello, C. M. (2014). Traditional
difference-score analyses of reasoning are flawed.
Cognition 131, 75–91. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.
2013.12.003
Luo, J., Liu, X., Stupple, E. J. N., Zhang, E., Xiao, X.,
Jia, L., et al. (2013). Cognitive control in belief-
laden reasoning during conclusion processing: an
ERP study. Int. J. Psychol. 48, 224–231. doi:10.1080/
00207594.2012.677539
Luo, J., Yuan, J., Qiu, J., Zhang, Q., Zhong, J., and
Huai, Z. (2008). Neural correlates of the belief-
bias effect in syllogistic reasoning: an event-related
potential study. Neuroreport 19, 1073–1078. doi:10.
1097/WNR.0b013e3283052fe1
Macmillan, N. A., and Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detec-
tion Theory: A User’s Guide, 2nd Edn. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Mickes, L., Flowe, H. D., and Wixted, J. T. (2012).
Receiver operating characteristic analysis of eyewit-
ness memory: comparing the diagnostic accuracy
of simultaneous versus sequential lineups. J. Exp.
Psychol. 18, 361–376. doi:10.1037/a0030609
Newstead, S. E., Pollard, P., Evans, J. S., and Allen, J.
(1992). The source of belief bias effects in syllogis-
tic reasoning. Cognition 45, 257–284. doi:10.1016/
0010-0277(92)90019-E
Nosofsky, R. M., Little, D. R., and James, T. W. (2012).
Activation in the neural network responsible for
categorization and recognition reflects parameter
changes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 333–338.
doi:10.1073/pnas.1111304109
Oakhill, J. V., and Johnson-Laird, P. (1985). The effects
of belief on the spontaneous production of syllo-
gistic conclusions. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 37, 553–569.
doi:10.1080/14640748508400919
Quayle, J., and Ball, L. (2000). Working memory,
metacognitive uncertainty, and belief bias in syllo-
gistic reasoning. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A 53, 1202–1223.
doi:10.1080/02724980050156362
Reber,P. J., Stark,C. E. L., and Squire,L. R. (1998). Con-
trasting cortical activity associated with category
memory and recognition memory. Learn. Mem. 5,
420–428.
Rotello, C. M., Macmillan, N. A., Reeder, J. A., and
Wong, M. (2005). The remember response: sub-
ject to bias, graded, and not a process-pure indica-
tor of recollection. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 12, 865–873.
doi:10.3758/BF03196778
Stollstorff, M., Vartanian, O., and Goel, V. (2012). Lev-
els of conflict in reasoning modulate right lateral
prefrontal cortex. Brain Res. 1428, 24–32. doi:10.
1016/j.brainres.2011.05.045
Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., and Verde, M. F. (2013). The
SDT model of belief bias: complexity, time, and
cognitive ability mediate the effects of believability.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 862 | 3
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rotello and Heit Neural correlates of belief bias
J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 39, 1393–1402.
doi:10.1037/a0032398
Tsujii, T., Masuda, S., Akiyama, T., and Watan-
abe, S. (2010a). The role of inferior frontal
cortex in belief-bias reasoning: an rTMS study.
Neuropsychologia 48, 2005–2008. doi:10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2010.03.021
Tsujii, T., Okada, M., and Watanabe, S. (2010b). Effects
of aging on hemispheric asymmetry in inferior
frontal cortex activity during belief-bias syllogis-
tic reasoning: a near-infrared spectroscopy study.
Behav. Brain Res. 210, 178–183. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.
2010.02.027
Tsujii, T., and Watanabe, S. (2009). Neural correlates of
dual-task effect on belief-bias syllogistic reasoning:
a near-infrared spectroscopy study. Brain Res. 1287,
118–125. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2009.06.080
Tsujii, T., and Watanabe, S. (2010). Neural correlates
of belief-bias reasoning under time pressure: a
near-infrared spectroscopy study. Neuroimage 50,
1320–1326. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.01.026
Verde, M. F., and Rotello, C. M. (2003). Does familiar-
ity change in the revelation effect? J. Exp. Psychol.
Learn. Mem. Cogn. 29, 739–746. doi:10.1037/0278-
7393.29.5.739
White, C. N., Mumford, J. A., and Poldrack, R.
A. (2012). Perceptual criteria in the human
brain. J. Neurosci. 32, 16716–16724. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.1744-12.2012
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 23 July 2014; accepted: 07 October 2014;
published online: 21 October 2014.
Citation: Rotello CM and Heit E (2014) The neural cor-
relates of belief bias: activation in inferior frontal cortex
reflects response rate differences. Front. Hum. Neurosci.
8:862. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00862
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2014 Rotello and Heit . This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 862 | 4
